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Strengthening the Evaluation of Evidence in International Criminal Trials 
Abstract 
Recent studies have highlighted instances where findings of fact reached by international 
criminal tribunals appear not to be adequately supported by the evidence. These works have 
typically focused on evidential issues, such as witnesses’ fading memories, cultural 
differences in witnesses’ re-telling of their experiences that are not appreciated by judges, and 
more sinister aspects (such as financial incentives offered to witnesses) as the root causes for 
such discrepancies. However, this article argues that these accounts are incomplete, as they 
do not recognise difficulties arising from the judicial evaluation of, and reasoning on, the 
evidential record, which poses potentially insurmountable challenges to reliable fact-finding 
by international criminal tribunals. This paper examines the analysis of evidence in 
international criminal trials, and highlights recent differences of opinion between judges on 
how evidence should be weighed and evaluated. It points to some unique issues arising from 
the enormity of the fact-finding role in international criminal trials, and the procedural 
framework embraced by the international criminal tribunals. It discusses alternative tools to 
assist fact-finding, and their potential applicability to international criminal trials. 
Keywords 
Evidence; Proof; Fact-finding; ICC; ICTY; ICTR 
1. Introduction  
Findings of fact bear particular importance in international criminal trials. Not only is it the 
primary purpose of the international criminal trial, as with any trial, to establish the guilt or 
innocence of the accused; international criminal tribunals carry an additional burden, insofar 
as their findings are expected to establish ‘undisputable findings regarding the atrocities 
committed’,1 and thereby to contribute to peace and reconciliation in the affected regions. 
Given the relatively small number of defendants before international criminal tribunals and 
the budgetary and personnel resources at their disposal, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
                                                          
* The author would like to thank Joanna Nicholson and the organizers and participants of the ‘Strengthening the 
Validity of International Criminal Tribunals’ conference in Oslo, August 2016, for very valuable comments on 
an earlier draft. E-mail: y.mcdermott@bangor.ac.uk.  
1 Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Foreword’ in Karim A. A. Khan, Caroline Buisman and Christopher Gosnell 
(eds.), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) pp. v-
vi, v.  
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their factual findings will be objectively defensible and capable of withstanding rigorous 
scrutiny.  
There has been an explosion of interest in the issue of fact-finding by international criminal 
tribunals in recent years. As a scholarly endeavour, studies of proof in law have a rich 
pedigree – they can be traced to at least as far back as John Henry Wigmore’s Science of 
Judicial Proof over a century ago,2 through to Jerome Frank’s ‘fact-scepticism’ in the 1930s,3 
to the debate about the place of probability in the criminal law between Cohen and others in 
the 1970s and 1980s,4 to more recently, William Twining and others’ plea for ‘taking facts 
seriously’.5 
1.1. Taking Facts Seriously in International Criminal Law  
The new evidence scholarship in international criminal law has followed broadly the same 
trajectory as evidence scholarship in the common law tradition.6 Early works focused almost 
exclusively on rules of admissibility and the move towards liberalisation of those rules.7 Then 
Nancy Combs’s book, Fact Finding without Facts, marked a significant turn towards an 
examination of the proof side of evidence in international criminal trials.8  
                                                          
2 John Henry Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof as given by Logic, Psychology, and General 
Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials (Little Brown & Co., Chicago, 1913).  
3 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano's, New York, 1930), p. xlii. 
4 L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977); critiqued in, amongst 
others, Glanville Williams, ‘The Mathematics of Proof – I’, Criminal Law Review [1979] 279 and Glanville 
Williams, ‘The Mathematics of Proof – II’, Criminal Law Review [1979] 340). 
5 William Twining, ‘Taking Facts Seriously’ in William Twining, Rethinking Evidence (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 14. Twining and his co-authors wanted to incorporate skills training on ‘marshalling 
facts’ into professional legal education: Terence Anderson, David Schum and William Twining, Analysis of 
Evidence (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. xvii. 
6 Paul Roberts, ‘The Priority of Procedure and the Neglect of Evidence and Proof: Facing Facts in International 
Criminal Law’, 13(3) J. Int. Crim. Just. (2015) 479-506, p. 481. 
7 Peter Murphy, ‘No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admission of Evidence is a Serious Flaw in 
International Criminal Trials’, 8(2) J. Int. Crim. Just. (2010) 539-573; Steven Kay, ‘The Move from Oral 
Evidence to Written Evidence: ‘The Law Is Always Too Short and Too Tight for Growing Humankind’, 2(2) J. 
Int. Crim. Just. (2004) 495-502; Eugene O’Sullivan and Deirdre Montgomery, ‘The Erosion of the Right to 
Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at the ICTY’, 8(2) J. Int. Crim. Just. (2010) 511-538. 
8 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010). 
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Combs saw the prevailing assumption at the time as this: even if international criminal trials 
could not meet some of their more lofty goals of spreading peace and deterring future war 
criminals – at least they could tell us who did what to whom.9 Through a microscopic 
analysis of witness statements and testimony, Combs revealed serious inconsistencies in such 
areas as dates, times, distances, and important details, such as who was present at a particular 
place and time, which challenged that assumption.10 Combs identified a number of unique 
fact-finding impediments faced by international criminal tribunals, namely: the educational 
attainment of some witnesses, and a failure to comprehend certain concepts as a result; 
witness intimidation and contempt; communication breakdowns between witnesses and 
lawyers, caused by linguistic and/or cultural differences, and false testimony.11  
1.2. Examining the Evaluation of Evidence  
The identification of these impediments to fact-finding are important, but this article posits 
that they only tell half the story, insofar as they do not tell us much about the impact of such 
discrepancies on final judgments. Combs herself argued that ‘the testimonial deficiencies 
plaguing the international tribunals impair their fact-finding competence to such a degree as 
to render international criminal proceedings a form of show trial’,12 but her more recent work 
argues that judges are taking serious inconsistencies in witnesses’ accounts more seriously.13 
Combs also forms the impression from judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) ‘that Trial Chambers cast a skeptical eye on the testimony of accomplice 
witnesses and witnesses who have been imprisoned for genocide crimes.’14 This impression 
may be rather optimistic. Taking the Ngirabatware judgment as an example, the Trial 
Chamber did indeed note that it treated the testimony of witnesses ANAN and ANAT with 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p. 188. 
10 Ibid., pp. 21-43. 
11 Ibid., pp. 63-149. 
12 Ibid., p. 172.  
13 Nancy Combs, ‘Grave Crimes and Weak Evidence: A Fact-Finding Evolution in International Criminal Law’ 
38 Harv. Int. L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2016: available online via http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759317), p/ 68.  
14 Ibid., p. 53. 
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caution, given that they had been convicted of crimes during the genocide.15 However, it then 
went on to base the accused’s conviction for incitement at two roadblocks solely based on 
one or both of these witnesses’ testimony (despite there being no corroborating evidence, and 
despite the existence of testimony from United Nations military observers and others to the 
contrary).16  
As the international criminal tribunals established to try those most responsible for atrocities 
in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone are winding up or have closed, and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) becomes the only permanent international criminal court, 
the time is ripe to take a wide-reaching view of the judicial evaluation of, and reasoning on, 
the evidential record in international criminal trials, to determine what lessons can be learned 
for the conduct of future trials. This article discusses, in Section 2, the approach taken by the 
international criminal tribunals to the evaluation of evidence to date. Having classified the 
‘atomistic’ and ‘holistic’ approaches to fact-finding, Section 3 of this article then moves to 
discuss the main barriers to reliable fact-finding faced by the tribunals. Section 4 presents 
some models of proof and tools that might potentially be utilized by the tribunals, while 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the opportunities that international criminal 
tribunals can seize upon going forward to strengthen the robustness of their findings of fact, 
and enhance the legitimacy of their decisions.  
2. Judicial Approaches to the Evaluation of Evidence in International Criminal 
Tribunals: Divergence and Conflict 
A number of authors have attempted to extract from international criminal judgments some 
clarity on how judges approach, analyze and synthesize evidence before them. Mark 
                                                          
15 Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, 20 December 2012, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, Judgment and Sentence, ICTR-99-
54-T, http://wwww.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-54/trial-judgements/en/121220.pdf, 
accessed 2 November 2016, para. 283. 
16 Ibid, paras 299; 318. 
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Klamberg posits that they take the following steps: (i) evaluation of a single piece of 
evidence; (ii) weighing of the totality of the evidence in favour of or against the proposition 
[of guilt or innocence]; (iii) final determination of whether the combined evidential value is 
sufficient to establish the proposition.17 One might argue that this very reasonable approach is 
not always evident from the judgments of international criminal tribunals. To the contrary, 
the manner in which judges evaluate evidence and draw conclusions from that evidence is 
difficult to derive and appears to be subject to a large degree of discrepancy. As Marjolien 
Cupido has noted, ‘The courts’ judgments do not consistently clarify which facts underlie the 
decisions, what weight is attached to these facts and how this factual evaluation relates to the 
legal framework of rules, elements, criteria and precedents.’ The basis for the weight given to 
different pieces of evidence is frequently inconsistent and often unpredictable.18 
This interest in how the tribunals approach the evidence before them is not just academic. 
Increasingly, dissenting and separate opinions highlight anxiety as to the approach taken by 
fellow judges to findings of fact. For example, in her dissenting opinion in Šešelj, Judge 
Lattanzi noted that she ‘disagree[d] with the majority of the Chamber on almost everything: 
the description of the context, the use of the evidence, the flawed or, at best, cursory analysis 
of the evidence, the disregard for the jurisprudence, and the conclusions.’19 In Karadžić, 
Judge Baird criticized a finding of the majority that he felt constituted ‘speculation run riot’.20 
                                                          
17 Mark Klamberg, ‘The Alternative Hypothesis Approach, Robustness and International Criminal Justice: A 
Plea for a “Combined Approach” to Evaluation of Evidence’, 13(3) J. Int. Crim. Just. (2015) 535-553, pp. 546-
547. 
18 Jerome N. Frank, ‘A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of Legal Pragmatism’, 9 
Rutgers L. Rev. (1954) 425-463, p. 447, makes a similar general point on when fact-finders exercise discretion 
over which witness to believe – ‘The trial court exercises “fact-discretion”… No-one has ever contrived any 
rules (generalized statements) for making that choice, for exercising that fact-discretion. It therefore lies beyond 
– is uncaptured by – rules, and it is “unruly”. Being unruly, it is usually unpredictable before the lawsuit 
commences.’ 
19 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, 31 March 2016, ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Judgement, IT-03-67-T, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tjug/en/160331.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016; Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Flavia Lattanzi – Amended Version, 31 March 2016, para. 1. 
20 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, 24 March 2016, ICTY, Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of Judgement Issued 
on 24 March 2016, IT-95-5/18-T, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, accessed 
2 November 2016; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Baird, para. 6098. 
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Similar criticisms arose from the Dissenting Opinion of Judges Trendafilova and Tarfusser in 
Ngudjolo, where they criticized the evaluation of evidence ‘as if it existed in a hermetically 
sealed compartment’.21 In Stanišić and Simatović, the Prosecutor argued that the Trial 
Chamber erred in its ‘compartmentalized assessment [of the evidence], which ... obscured the 
coherence of the circumstantial evidence adduced by the Prosecution’.22  The prosecutorial 
appeal of the acquittals was partially successful, and the case was sent back for a retrial 
before the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals, some 12 years after the 
acquitted men were first transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
2.1. Atomism v. Holism in the Judicial Evaluation of Evidence 
From these dissenting and separate opinions, we can determine that there are two broad 
schools of thought on the evaluation of the evidence.23 The first – favoured by the majority in 
Ngudjolo – prefers a more atomistic approach to the evidence, insofar as it examines each 
piece of evidence in the context of the evidential record, before forming an opinion on 
whether the totality of the evidence as a whole supports a conclusion.24 The purported danger 
of this approach is that the judges may be so caught up with the intricacies of whether the 
evidence supports individual inferences that they lose sight of the bigger picture of the guilt 
                                                          
21 Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, 7 April 2015, ICC, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal 
against the Decision of Trial Chamber II entitled ‘Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, ICC-01/04-
02/12, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_02537.PDF, accessed 2 November 2016; Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova and Judge Cuno Tarfusser, para. 46.  
22 Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, 9 December 2015, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-03-69-A, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/acjug/en/151209-judgement.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016, 
para. 64.  
23 The main features of the two approaches to the evaluation of evidence – ‘atomistic’ and ‘holistic’ – are 
discussed at length in Michael S. Pardo, ‘Juridical Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward 
Evidentiary Holism’ 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. (2000-2001) 399-442. 
24 Cf. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe, 7 July 2006, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 
ICTR-99-46-A, http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-46/trial-
judgements/en/060707.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016, para. 174, where three stages for the evaluation of 
evidence were set out: 1) An assessment of the credibility of the evidence (‘This cannot be undertaken by a 
piecemeal approach’); 2) A determination of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution supports the 
facts alleged, notwithstanding the defence evidence; 3) An analysis of whether all of the elements of the crimes 
and mode(s) of liability charged have been proven.  
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or innocence of the accused.25 Indeed, an application of the criminal standard of proof to each 
item of evidence would constitute an error.26 
The second approach, by contrast, takes a more holistic view to the evidence as a whole. This 
approach was favoured by Judges Diarra and Cotte in in Katanga; they argued against ‘the 
approach whereby the probative value of each piece of evidence is evaluated in a fragmentary 
manner or one which would lead to the application of the beyond reasonable doubt standard 
to all the facts in the case.’27  
The danger of the holistic approach is that it might be used to ‘paper over the cracks’, so to 
speak, or to brush over some specific gaps in the evidence because of the judges’ 
impressionistic feeling that this particular accused is guilty. Such an approach may be 
suitable in a system where the standard of proof is l’intime conviction du juge, but it is 
profoundly unsuited to a system of proof beyond reasonable doubt.28  
 An appeal to holism may also result in a less focused prosecution case. To give an example, 
in Ngirabatware, the ICTR Trial Chamber noted that the Prosecutor had not made specific 
any submissions on 11 counts of the indictment, and that ‘[u]nder specific circumstances, this 
may signal that the Prosecution is no longer pursuing a conviction based on allegations 
contained in the omitted paragraphs, and that it may therefore be unfair to convict the accused 
on such allegations.’29 Nevertheless, the Chamber recalled that ‘it specifically asked the 
Prosecution for its comments on this issue, to which the Prosecution… explained that “[t]he 
                                                          
25 I refute this argument in Yvonne McDermott, ‘Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal 
Trials’, 13(3) J. Int. Crim. Just. (2015) 507-533, p. 528. 
26 Ntagerura, supra note 24, para. 24.  
27 Prosecutor v. Katanga, 7 March 2014, ICC, Trial Chamber II, Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 
du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF, accessed 2 November 
2016; Concurring opinion of Judges Fatoumata Diarra and Bruno Cotte, para. 4.  
28 McDermott, supra note 25, p. 528. 
29 Ngirabatware, supra note 15, para. 18. 
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trial record speaks for itself”’.30 The Chamber went on to consider the culpability of the 
accused for those counts on the basis of the evidential record ‘as a whole’. This shows that 
holism allows the prosecution to lay down all of the evidence it has without explicitly linking 
that evidence to specific charges, and hope that some of it sticks to specific charges – hardly 
an ideal trial strategy, and one that makes it exceptionally difficult for the accused to defend 
himself against the charges. 
On balance, then, it would appear that both the ‘atomistic’ approach, which examines each 
element of the case and the extent to which the evidence supports, or does not support, an 
inference which the court is asked to draw from that evidence, and the ‘holistic’ evaluation of 
the evidence, both have a place in the evaluation of evidence. As Michael Pardo has 
convincingly argued, a holistic framework should ‘not eliminate the need for atomistic 
analysis, but shows that we must see any such analysis as dependent on the evidentiary 
scheme in which one chooses to analyze the atoms.’31 Rather than seeing the two approaches 
as incompatible camps from which the international judge must choose one, we can develop a 
framework by which individual pieces of evidence, and the inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom, are subjected to rigorous analysis, whilst not losing sight of the bigger picture of 
what needs to be proven. Some methods for combining both microscopic analysis and 
macroscopic marshaling of the evidence are laid out in Part 4 below. It suffices to say at this 
juncture that a combination of the atomistic and holistic approaches can be achieved – 
individual pieces of evidence can be subjected to searching scrutiny, but this must take place 
in the context of an analysis of the evidential record as a whole.32 This combined approach 
                                                          
30 Ibid., para. 19.  
31 Pardo, supra note 23, pp. 438-439. 
32 The Lubanga Appeals Judgment, whilst expressly referring to a holistic approach, actually represents a 
practical example of this mixed approach: ‘The Trial Chamber is required to carry out a holistic evaluation and 
weighing of all the evidence taken together in relation to the fact at issue’: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 1 December 
2014, ICC, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, 
ICC-01/04-01/06 A5, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09844.PDF, accessed 2 November 2016, 
para. 20. 
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would signal a move away from such hollow statements as, ‘it does not necessarily follow 
that because a Trial Chamber did not refer to any particular evidence or testimony in its 
reasoning, it disregarded it’,33 which are not uncommon in trial judgments and can give an 
impression of empty holism, where judgments are based on an overall feeling, rather than a 
clearly articulated evidential basis. 
2.2. Significance of the Holistic v. Atomistic Schools of Thought  
More generally, the division in approaches to the evaluation of evidence between ‘atomistic’ 
and ‘holistic’ approaches suggests a deep divide amongst international criminal judges as to 
what exactly the standard of proof requires of them. Of course, the standard of ‘proof beyond 
reasonable doubt’ is notoriously difficult to define. Several attempts have been made over the 
years to come up with a formulation that would best convey the standard to lay jurors,34 and 
indeed it is generally seen as unwise for judges to elaborate on the standard.35 However, the 
deep-seated divide between judges’ approaches, as evidenced by the strongly worded 
dissenting and separate opinions discussed above, highlights the need for an attempt to 
reconcile the two approaches and to try to find a common ground on the approach to 
evaluating evidence.  
It may have been thought unnecessary, in the early years of the tribunals’ operation, for 
judges to come to an agreed explicit understanding on what the standard of ‘proof beyond 
reasonable doubt’ actually meant, given that judges in international criminal tribunals are 
professionals with a great deal of experience. However, it could be argued that, given the 
great diversity of backgrounds from which international criminal judges hail, there is an even 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
33 Prosecutor v. Musema, 16 November 2001, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTR-96-13-A, 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-13/appeals-chamber-
judgements/en/011116.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016, para. 20. 
34 Federico Picinali, ‘The Threshold Lies in the Method: Instructing Jurors about Reasoning Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt’ 19(3) Int. J. of Evidence & Proof (2015) 139-153.  
35 R v. Yap Chuan Ching, (1976) 63 Cr App Rep 7, para. 11.  
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greater need for an explicit formulation of what the standard of proof actually requires. It 
seems unlikely, for example, that the majority of judges would agree with the approach taken 
in the Šešelj judgment when it found it had not ‘receive[d] sufficient evidence to irrefutably 
establish the existence of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian 
population’.36 A standard of irrefutable proof appears to be much more stringent than the 
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that seems to have been the crucial difference 
between the majority and Judge Lattanzi, who, in her dissenting judgment, noted:  
I can confirm that the Chamber received ample evidence on the widespread and 
systematic attack... Furthermore, I note that, even though the majority states in the 
Judgement that the evidence submitted was examined, this evidence is cited only in a 
disorderly manner in the footnotes, without a real analysis allowing for an understanding 
of how the majority arrived at such a conclusion.37  
Judge Lattanzi’s dissent highlights the need for a fully reasoned judgment indicating which 
parts of the evidence led the Chamber to reach its conclusions; this is another area where 
there is a great deal of divergence between differently-constituted benches. The ICTR 
Appeals Chamber in Bizimungu helpfully outlined that: 
[A] trial chamber should set out in a clear and articulate manner the factual and legal 
findings on the basis of which it reached the decision to convict or acquit an accused. 
A reasoned opinion in the trial judgment is essential to ensuring that the Tribunal’s 
adjudications are fair, and, inter alia, allows for a meaningful exercise of the right of 
appeal by the parties, and enables the Appeals Chamber to understand and review the 
trial chamber’s findings.38    
Yet, it is clear that some judgments continue to fail in fully articulating the basis of their 
factual and legal findings; indeed, in Bizimungu, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial 
                                                          
36 Šešelj, supra note 19, para. 192 (emphasis added). 
37 Ibid., Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Flavia Lattanzi – Amended Version, para. 11.  
38 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, 30 June 2014, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTR-00-56B-A, 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-00-56/appeals-chamber-
judgements/en/140630.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016, paras. 18-19.  
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Chamber had ‘failed to even attempt to address … whether the evidence adduced was 
sufficient to prove Bizimungu’s individual criminal responsibility’.39  
A further point of note on the degree of judicial diversity as to approaches to evaluation of 
the evidence is that it does not appear to be attributable to the judge’s own background or the 
legal system from which they hail. It is notable that Judge van den Wyngaert, from Belgium 
(a civil law system) was criticized for her atomistic approach to the evidence in Katanga,40 
while Judges Tarfusser and Trendafilova (from Italy and Bulgaria, both broadly civil law 
systems) clearly preferred a more holistic approach.41  
3. Barriers to Reliable Fact-Finding in International Criminal Trials 
Aside from the difficulties mentioned by Combs, above, relating to the difficulties in 
obtaining reliable evidence, some other barriers to fact-finding are worthy of further analysis. 
These are: the volume of the evidential record; the procedural confusion that persists as 
regards the Trial Chamber’s truth-seeking role, and issues surrounding judicial collegiality.  
3.1. Volume of Evidence 
The sheer enormity of the evidential record in most international criminal trials is difficult to 
comprehend. Keynes’s idea of ‘weight’ has as its main premise that the introduction of 
further evidence may sometimes decrease the probability of a proposition, but will always 
increase its weight.42 In international criminal trials, it is simply impossible to consider all of 
the relevant evidence available on the events under consideration, given the scope of 
international crimes. The evidential record of some cases already stretches to over 1,000,000 
                                                          
39 Ibid., para. 19. 
40 Katanga, supra note 27, Concurring opinion of Judges Fatoumata Diarra and Bruno Cotte, para. 4. 
41 Ngudjolo, supra note 21, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova and Judge Cuno 
Tarfusser. 
42 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan, London, 1921), pp. 71-77. Because the term 
‘weight’ can be confusing in this context, others have proposed alternative terms, such as the ‘quantum’ or 
‘robustness’ of the evidence: Ho Hock Lai, A Philosophy of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008), p. 167; Mark Klamberg, Evidence in International Criminal Trials: Confronting Legal Gaps and the 
Reconstruction of Disputed Events (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2013), pp. 154-156.   
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pages,43 and even those cases that are limited in scope – such as that of Lubanga, charging 
the accused with the sole crime of recruiting child soldiers – present enormous evidential 
records.44 For judges to receive, process, and analyse these huge evidential records, and bear 
all of the relevant pieces of evidence in mind when reaching findings of fact, is clearly an 
incredibly onerous task. 
Simon De Smet has argued that one way for international criminal courts to strengthen their 
factual findings would be to receive more evidence, but that this would only be feasible if 
they out-sourced or delegated part of their fact-finding task, perhaps using one of the formal 
models of proof outlined in Part 4 of this article below.45 However, it could be argued that a 
great deal of outsourcing of the tribunals’ fact-finding role already goes on, through the 
extensive use of the doctrine of judicial notice, particularly at the ad hoc tribunals. The 
doctrine, as used by the tribunals allows judicial notice to be taken, not just of facts of 
common knowledge, but also of adjudicated facts from other cases.46 In Karadžić, a number 
of the Trial Chamber’s conclusions were based entirely on facts that were judicially noticed 
from earlier trials.47 Again, there is a great deal of diversity amongst Chambers in their 
approach to this issue; this approach can be contrasted with that taken by a differently-
constituted ICTY Trial Chamber in Šešelj, which found that: ‘The independent nature of the 
proceedings and the relativity of the adjudicated matter do not allow a Trial Chamber to rely 
on the legal or factual findings of another Chamber and extend those findings to its own 
                                                          
43 Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., 29 May 2013, ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Judgment, IT-04-74-T, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/130529-1.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016, Annex 2, ‘Procedural 
History’. 
44 The Lubanga Trial Chamber heard 67 witnesses and received 1,373 items of documentary evidence over the 
six years of the trial.  
45 Simon De Smet, ‘Communicating about Probative Value of Evidence and the ‘Strength’ of Factual Findings 
(in the Context of International Criminal Proceedings)’, paper presented at ICAIL 2015 Workshop, Studying 
Evidence in the Law: Formal, Computational and Philosophical Methods, June 2015, 
https://icail2015evidence.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/desmet.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016.  
46 See further, Yvonne McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2016), pp. 44-46. 
47 Karadžić, supra note 21, paras. 874, 913, 1778.  
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case.’48 A degree of clarity and consistency on the question of judicial notice and its proper 
uses would be welcome.   
3.2. Procedural frameworks of the tribunals and lack of clarity on evaluation of evidence 
The second barrier to reliable fact-finding in international criminal trials is the confusion 
surrounding the procedural framework of the tribunals. Uncertainty still abounds about the 
proper boundaries of the judicial role and the place of judicial intervention at trial. As 
Rosemary Byrne’s research has shown, some judges and benches are extremely 
interventionist while others do not intervene in the questioning of witnesses or the conduct of 
proceedings at all.49  
International criminal tribunals are often referred to as representing a sui generis or mixed 
procedural model. However, the ICC’s procedural framework highlights this lack of clarity – 
the Prosecutor has an obligation under the Statute to ‘investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally’.50 This is most similar, broadly speaking, to an 
inquisitorial legal tradition. However, at trial, the procedure is clearly adversarial, or party 
based. Unlike in inquisitorial systems, the ICC Prosecutor is not required to create a dossier 
of evidence; rather, the rules of disclosure that come from adversarial systems apply, and the 
trial is structured as an ‘argument’ between Prosecution and Defence (with additional input 
from participating victims), so the presentation of evidence remains entirely party-driven or 
adversarial.51 There is nothing wrong, in principle, with international courts adopting a mixed 
procedural model, but as Mirjan Damaška has pointed out, choosing a procedural model ‘is 
not like shopping in a boutique’ – one cannot simply pick the elements one likes and discard 
                                                          
48 Šešelj, supra note 19, para. 190.  
49 Rosemary Byrne, ‘The New Public International Lawyer and the Hidden Art of International Criminal Trial 
Practice’ 25 Conn. J. Int. L. (2010) 243-303.  
50 Article 54(1)(a), ICC Statute.  
51 Goran Sluiter, ‘Procedural Lawmaking’ in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the 
International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), 315-331, 320.  
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those that one does not like, because each of those elements forms part of a finely-tuned 
interrelated system.52 Without the creation of a dossier or any form of judicial oversight, the 
obligation becomes essentially meaningless, and relies entirely on us putting a great deal of 
trust in the Prosecutor. Early experiences in the Lubanga case showed that the disclosure of 
exculpatory materials by the prosecution cannot always be guaranteed.53 We could also point 
to diversity in evidential rules – such as a preference for oral testimony, combined with an 
extensive set of (recently-added54) rules on the admission of affidavit testimony that precisely 
undermine that preference, as further evidence of the confused procedural model at the ICC 
and elsewhere.  
3.3.  Collegiality  
As divergences of opinion in the dissenting opinions mentioned above have shown, the 
collegiate nature of decision-making appears to pose some unique challenges when judges 
differ on the weight to be given to particular piece of evidence, or on the ultimate reading of 
whether the evidence leads to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.55 John Jackson 
and Sean Doran, in their study of the Diplock trials in Northern Ireland, noted judicial 
resistance collective decision-making, with one judge interviewed noting that ‘no-one can 
help the judge on this fact-finding responsibility’.56 This resistance may be more pronounced 
in international criminal tribunals, where judges come from a great diversity of backgrounds; 
some may have been criminal court judges in their own legal system, whilst others may have 
                                                          
52 Mirjan R. Damaška, ‘Epistemology and Legal Regulation of Proof’ 2 Law, Probability and Risk (2003) 117-
130, 121. 
53 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 13 June 2008, ICC, Trial Chamber I, Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure 
of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of 
the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ICC-01/04-
01/06, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_03428.PDF, accessed 2 November 2016, paras 77-89. 
54 Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, adopted 12 November 2013 (amending Rule 68 of the ICC Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence). 
55 On the importance of collegiality, see Hemi Mistry, ‘Collegiality at the International Criminal Court: Lessons 
from Other International Courts?’, in this issue. 
56 John Jackson and Sean Doran, Judge without Jury: Diplock Trials in the Adversary System (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1995), 213.  
 15 
been diplomats or international law professors and their appointment to the international 
court may represent the first criminal trial they have sat in judgment of.57 That is not to 
suggest that the judges from criminal law backgrounds are necessarily more suitable for the 
role – some of international criminal law’s finest judges have come from non-judicial 
backgrounds – but rather that judges who are used to sitting in judgment alone in their own 
legal systems may find it difficult to defer to their colleagues and engage in joint decision-
making. 
In addition, we have to bear in mind that, on occasion, given the length of trials (and owing to 
non-re-election to the Tribunal, or dismissal on the grounds of bias, or illness or death) the 
panel of judges at the start of trial differs by the end of trial, so those that have to weigh up 
the evidence as a whole may not have been there when the evidence was presented. In Šešelj, 
after the close of trial (which lasted almost five years), Judge Harhoff was disqualified from 
the case and replaced with Judge Niang who was initially given six months to familiarise 
himself with the trial record as a whole.58 In her dissent, Judge Lattanzi noted that Judge 
Niang, having not been present at the hearings, was probably unaware of a climate of 
intimidation that pervaded the trial.  
4. Models of Proof and Tools to Assist in Fact-Finding 
 
                                                          
57 Article 36(3)(b) of the ICC Statute requires that judges have established competence in either criminal law 
and procedure or have established competence in relevant areas of international law. See further, Gideon Boas, 
James L. Bischoff, Natalie L. Reid, B. Don Taylor III, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, Volume 
III: International Criminal Procedure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), pp. 253-255; Michael 
Bohlander, ‘The International Criminal Judiciary: Problems of Judicial Selection, Independence and Ethics’ in 
Michael Bohlander (ed.), International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures 
(New York: Cameron May, 2007) pp. 325-390.  
58 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, 28 August 2013, ICTY, Chamber Convened by Order of the Vice-President, Decision on 
Defence Motion for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, IT-03-67-T, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/130828.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016; Prosecutor v. Šešelj, 31 
October 2013, ICTY, President, Order Assigning a Judge Pursuant to Rule 15, IT-03-67-T, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/presord/en/131031.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016. 
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Broadly speaking, there are two major theories on how individuals base their decisions on 
evidence. The first, called the ‘meter model’ by Hastie, is based on the premise that the 
decision-maker starts with a belief, and those beliefs are updated as the trial goes along.59 
Lon Fuller, noting an American Bar Association statement, outlined the psychological 
background of this theory: 
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a familiar pattern will seem 
to emerge from the evidence; an accustomed label is waiting for the case and, without 
waiting further proofs, this label is promptly assigned to it. It is a mistake to suppose that 
this premature cataloguing must necessarily result from impatience, prejudice or mental 
sloth. Often it proceeds from a very understandable desire to bring the hearing into some 
order and coherence, for without some tentative theory of the case there is no standard of 
relevance by which testimony may be measured.60  
On the other hand, the ‘story model’61 or ‘narrative theory’ of proof, the decision-maker is 
most influenced by the most coherent narrative that fits the evidence presented. In 
Nsengimana, for example, the ICTR referred to the ‘competing narratives’ on the evidence 
that had been presented to the Chamber.62 These two approaches – the meter model and the 
story model – are important to bear in mind when discussing potential methods or tools to 
assist in judicial decision-making.   
4.1. Bayes Nets 
The first, the Bayesian Network, is most closely linked to the ‘meter model’. Bayes Nets, as 
they are known, are graphical models of the probabilistic relationships between hypotheses 
and pieces of evidence. Bayes Nets have their origins in a theorem developed by the 
Reverend Thomas Bayes in the 18th century. Bayes’ theorem enables the calculation of the 
                                                          
59 Lola Lopes, ‘Two Conceptions of the Juror’ in Reid Hastie (ed.) Inside the Juror (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) 
255.  
60 Lon L. Fuller, ‘The Adversary System’ in Harold J. Berman (ed.) The Adversary System: Talks on American 
Law (Vintage Books, New York, 1961) 30-43.  
61 Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, ‘The Story Model for Juror Decision-Making’ in Reid Hastie (ed.) Inside 
the Juror (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 192-224. 
62 Prosecutor v. Nsengimana, 17 November 2009, ICTR, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, ICTR-01-69-T, 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-01-69/trial-judgements/en/091117.pdf, 
accessed 2 November 2016, paras. 221; 439; 667. 
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revised odds in favour of a proposition, usually associated with the prosecution, in 
comparison with an alternative proposition, usually associated with the defence, when 
evidence relevant to the truth or otherwise of the propositions, is taken into account. The 
application of Bayes’ theorem relies on the individual decision-maker quantifying prior 
probabilities based on their own intuition.63 Thus, ‘any resulting inferences of probative value 
extracted from Bayes nets can only be as good, or as bad, as the initial human inputs.’64 The 
decision-maker’s prior beliefs are updated as new evidence is presented, in accordance with 
the probability of that particular piece of evidence. The application of Bayes’ Theorem, 
therefore, encourages fact-finders to interrogate the strength of their own confidence in the 
truth of a proposition. By today, free software is available to assist in the creation of Bayes 
Nets, which makes the calculation of revised probabilities much less onerous than any 
manual attempt to do so.65  
By committing to estimates of uncertainty for each piece of evidence as part of the reasoning 
process, the exercise of creating a Bayes Net forces the decision-maker to confront the 
strength of their confidence in their conclusions. Moreover, an understanding of basic rules of 
probability may avoid judges falling into some common errors in reasoning, such as finding 
that they are more certain of one finding than they are of its component parts.66 We can see 
such an error in reasoning in Gbagbo, where the Prosecutor argued that the Trial Chamber 
erred in finding that ‘each incident underlying the contextual elements of crimes against 
                                                          
63 Paul Roberts and Colin Aitken, The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal Evidence and 
Forensic Science Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses, Royal Statistical 
Society Practitioner Guide No. 3 (2014), available online at http://www.rss.org.uk/statsandlaw, accessed 2 
November 2016, p. 104. 
64 Ibid. 
65 For an example of a practical application of Bayesian probability to international criminal trials, see Yvonne 
McDermott and Colin Aitken, ‘Analysis of Evidence in International Criminal Trials Using Bayesian Belief 
Networks’ (working paper; on file with author). 
66 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, 3 June 2013, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision adjourning the hearing on the 
confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/11-01/11, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04878.PDF, accessed 2 November 2016; Office of the Prosecutor, ‘OTP 
Statement on Confirmation of Charges hearing in Laurent Gbagbo case’, 11 June 2013, https://www.icc-
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humanity must be established to the standard of proof enshrined in Article 61(7) of the 
Statute’. In other words, even if it could not prove that there were substantial grounds to 
believe that each individual incident making up the widespread attack actually occurred, all 
of these incidents could be taken together to determine that there were substantial grounds to 
believe that a widespread attack had indeed occurred. This approach ignores a basic rule of 
probability which states that the probability of two events occurring together is always less 
than or equal to the probability of one of those events occurring alone.67 Nevertheless, a 
different majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber later appeared to agree with this approach.68 
4.2. Wigmorean analysis 
Another method that might assist in case preparation and in decision making on mixed 
masses of evidence is Wigmorean analysis.69 Wigmorean analysis is a means for structuring, 
and graphically representing, facts, evidence, and inter-relationships among pieces of 
evidence. The method assists the chart-maker in structuring arguments and linking those 
arguments to evidence by requiring him or her to, first, formulate a ‘key list’ of all the 
relevant inferences in a case or part of a case, and the evidence that could be adduced to 
support or disprove from those inferences, and second, draw a chart that links all relevant 
inferences and evidence to the ‘ultimate probandum’ (the issue that must ultimately be 
proven). Thus, the approach is both macroscopic – identifying the relevant propositions that 
must be drawn to reach an ultimate conclusion on the guilt or innocence of the accused – and 
microscopic, insofar as it subjects all of the relevant evidence to scrutiny, to determine 
whether it supports an inference leading to that ultimate probandum.  
                                                          
67 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in 
Probability Judgment’, 90(4) Psychological Review (1983) 293-315.  
68 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, 12 June 2014, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04777.PDF, 
accessed 2 November 2016. 
69 Based on Wigmore, supra note 2. The arguments on the potentials of Wigmorean Analysis are expanded 
further in McDermott, supra note 25.  
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One key benefit of Wigmorean analysis is that it also incorporates generalisations or beliefs 
inherent in the decision-maker. Anderson and Twining refer to the decision-maker’s ‘stock of 
knowledge’ that is drawn from in decision-making.70 We might question to what extent those 
generalisations can transfer to such the different societies that international judges encounter 
in their judicial role. Yet, it is clear that judges do draw upon generalisations in deciding on 
the credibility of witnesses, or the coherence of evidence. In Gatete, for example, the 
Chamber noted that it had concerns on the merits of a witness’s evidence, because it was ‘not 
not convinced that she would have moved to only metres away from the Accused at the 
roadblock when Interahamwe, who according to her testimony had killed persons with 
“bladed weapons”, were present’.71 With respect, how anyone should ‘normally’ behave in 
the presence of machete-wielding génocidaires is something that most of us, including the 
international judge, can only imagine.  
4.3. Utilising Bayes Nets and Wigmorean Analysis in International Criminal Trials 
Refined versions of Wigmorean Analysis and Bayes Nets can both be utilized in a condensed 
form by focusing such methods on so-called ‘jugular facts’ in the case. The drafter of the 
chart or Network can use the method or methods to conduct a microscopic analysis of one 
crucial element of the case. Judgments show that conviction or acquittal frequently turn on 
one crucial element, such as whether the accused knew or had reason to know of the acts of 
his subordinates72 or their presence at a particular place at a particular time.73 
                                                          
70 Anderson and Twining, supra note 5, p. 275.  
71 Prosecutor v. Gatete, 31 March 2011, ICTR Trial Chamber III, Judgment and Sentence, ICTR-2000-61-T, 
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The benefit of the Bayes Net over Wigmorean analysis is that while the Wigmore chart does 
not attach any value or weight to the individual but related items of evidence that are 
pictorially represented, the Bayes Net expressly represents the probabilities of a variety of 
mutually conditional outcomes.74 There is perhaps a misconception that Bayesian probability 
generally is only relevant to those cases where the probability of a particular piece of 
evidence can be independently scientifically verified, as with a DNA profile. However, the 
method can also be used when subjective probabilities are involved. The application of 
Bayes’ Theorem encourages fact-finders to interrogate the strength of their own confidence in 
the truth of a proposition.  
It remains far from certain that judges and practitioners will be inclined to adopt formal 
methods, such as Wigmorean analysis and/or Bayes Nets, in their practice. Nevertheless, if a 
greater understanding of such methods were more widespread, this may give rise to a much-
needed debate in international criminal law on whether an atomistic or holistic approach to 
the evidence is deemed most suitable. Moreover, it would give rise to a long-overdue debate 
in international criminal law on the precise percentage of confidence in a finding that is 
required to meet the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard.75 Furthermore, as the tribunals 
incorporate different standards of proof for different stages of proceedings, it would be 
valuable to attempt to quantify the level of confidence required for the standards of 
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‘reasonable grounds to believe’,76 ‘substantial grounds to believe’,77 and ‘no case to 
answer’,78 as well as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.  
It must emphasised that these methods act as a tool for the illustration of the associations 
amongst items of evidence and propositions, and the strength of these associations (and, in 
the case of Bayes Nets, for the calculation of the probability of a proposition in light of the 
evidence at hand); the construction of a network is not a substitute for judicial reasoning, nor 
should it be. The exercises of determining which probabilities are conditional upon one 
another and allocating probabilities are fundamentally the task for the human decision-maker 
and, while new technology can assist with the calculations, it goes without saying that neither 
Bayes Nets nor Wigmore charts can act as a replacement to thinking.79  
5.  Conclusion: Towards More Reliable Fact-Finding in International Criminal Trials 
This article argued that a clear divergence in international criminal judges’ approach to fact-
finding has emerged in recent years. Some judges, who favour a more holistic approach to the 
evidence, have criticised their colleagues for taking an unduly ‘fragmentary’ approach to 
fact-finding, and vice versa. Having articulated this difference in approach, this article argued 
that a combination of features from both the atomistic and holistic styles is both achievable 
and favourable if the courts are to retain the legitimacy of their fact-finding authority.  
The article noted some of the barriers to fact-finding that persist in the international criminal 
tribunals; aside from issues surrounding the quality of evidence, which have been well-
                                                          
76 Article 58(1), ICC Statute. For an in-depth discussion, see Michael Ramsden and Cecilia Chung, 
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documented by other authors,80 the quantity of evidence, procedural confusion on the proper 
role of the Trial Chamber in searching for the truth, and a lack of judicial collegiality can be 
pointed to in this regard. 
In an era where states are withdrawing from the ICC,81 there is a need now more than ever for 
international criminal judges to approach their fact-finding task with the utmost rigour, and to 
clearly link their ultimate conclusions to their evidential bases. Section 4 of this article 
discussed some formal methods that can be used in evidential analysis – namely Bayesian 
Networks and Wigmorean analysis – and their potential applicability in international criminal 
trials. It argued that an attempt to incorporate these methods would provide an opportunity 
for judicial reflection on what the standard of proof requires, and even if these formal 
methods are not widely used in every aspect of every case, an awareness of the principles 
underpinning them would be extremely valuable as an aid to thinking about structuring the 
evidence and interrogating the interrelationships between pieces of evidence and inferences 
that the court is asked to draw. From an academic perspective, because of the wealth of 
information available on their trials, including transcripts, interim decisions and full reasoned 
judgments, international criminal trials provide an ideal canvas for interdisciplinary 
collaboration between scholars from a broad range of disciplines (including law, 
mathematics, epistemology and philosophy) with an interest in fact-finding, in models for the 
analysis of evidence, and more broadly, in truth and justice.  
Even if such formal methods are not considered or adopted in future international criminal 
law practice, there are reasons to believe that some of the barriers to fact-finding will not be 
as high in future practice. For one thing, we have just witnessed the first guilty plea before 
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the ICC,82 and such pleas obviously make the court’s role in fact-finding much more 
straightforward, even if the cathartic and truth-seeking aspects of a full trial might be missing. 
Secondly, the recent Bemba judgment and the significance of the FIDH’s contemporaneous 
evidence highlights the increased role of NGOs in gathering evidence. At the time of some of 
the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon and Sierra Leone, there was little 
expectation that these events would appear before an international criminal tribunal some 
day, and still less knowledge on what sort of evidence might be useful for such trials. By 
today, a number of NGOs are developing technology that allows users to make videos and 
other contemporaneous records and store them securely for later access. With these 
developments, and if a clearer approach to the evaluation of evidence as suggested by this 
article were taken in the future, international criminal tribunals could base their judgments on 
much more than, in the words of Mirjan Damaška, ‘a mere torso of actual wrongdoing’,83 and 
thereby protect their legacies and the lasting impact of their judgments for many years to 
come.  
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